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MISSOURI SECTION
son, also allow recovery by the representatives under a wrongful
death statute."'
Only one case, Buel -P. United Rys. Co. of St. Louigs,17 had been de-
cided on prenatal injuries in Missouri prior to the principal case. In
that case suit was brought under the wrongful death statute,18 and
recovery was denied to the representative of a child whose death was
caused by injuries inflicted while in the mother's womb. The court
held that since an infant could not recover for prenatal injuries if
he himself were alive, the presence of the statute was no reason to
grant relief to the survivors. By expressly overruling the Btel case,
the court in the principal case joined the progressive minority of
courts. The court would allow recovery to a person prenatally injured
and therefore did allow recovery to the representatives of the child
where the injuries were fatal, under the "plain terms" of the wrong-
ful death statute.9
The trend of the recent cases is definitely toward allowing recovery
to persons injured before birth, and allowing recovery by the repre-
sentatives of such persons where the injury is fatal. Commendable
though the trend may be, until there is a definite determination of
when a child is viable, and more adequate proof as to the causal con-
nection, extreme caution should be exercised before allowing recovery.
\VORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-COMMON LAW ACTION AGAINST EM-
PLOYER FOR INJURY NOT COMPENSABLE UNDER THE ACT
MeDa'niel v. Kerr. 258 S.W.2d 629 (Mo. 1953)
Plaintiff developed an abscessed lung from exposure to plaster dust
in the course of employment. He brought an action against his em-
ployer to recover damages for injuries resulting from defendant's al-
leged breach of his common law duty to provide a safe place in which
to work and adequate protective devices. Both plaintiff and defendant
had accepted coverage of the Missouri Workmen's Compensation Act
relating to injury by accident,' but not to occupational diseases.* The
trial court entered judgment for defendant notwithstanding the ver-
dict for plaintiff on the ground that the evidence showed as a matter
of law that plaintiff's injury was an accident within the meaning of
16. Verkennes v. Corniea, 229 Minn. 365, 38 N.W.2d 838 (1949) ; Sasinsky v.
Potts, 153 Ohio St. 529, 92 N.E.2d 809 (1950) ; Williams v. Marion Rapid Transit,
Inc., 152 Ohio St. 114, 87 N.E.2d 334 (1949).
17. 248 Mo. 126, 154 S.W. 71 (1913).
18. See note 1 supra.
19. Steggall v. Morris, 258 S.W.2d 577, 581 (Mo. 1953).
1. Mo. REV. STAT. § 287.010 et seq. (1949).
2. Mo. REv. STAT. § 287.020 (4) (1949). The court did not decide whether plain-
tiff's injury was or was not an occupational disease, because the parties had not
accepted the occupational disease provision.
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the Act, and, consequently, that plaintiff's proper remedy lay within.
the jurisdiction of the Workmen's Compensation Commission. The
Supreme Court of Missouri reversed the trial court's judgment and
directed reinstatement of the judgment and verdict for plaintiff. The
court in the principal case held that an employer can be liable at com-
mon law for injuries not compensable under the Workmen's Compen-
sation Act.3
While it is settled in Missouri that the sole remedy for an injury
compensable under the Act is by a procedure before the Workmen's
Compensation Commission, there are two possible views of the effect
of a workmen's compensation statute upon noncompensable injuries.
The minority view is that an employee cannot have an action at law
against his employer for such injury.5 This view is reasoied from the
proposition that workmen's compensation is essentially a balanced
agreement whereunder the employer has exchanged his common law
liability for a statutory liability. The common law liability was limited
in scope by both the fault concept and by common law defenses, but
was extended in depth by heavy adverse judgments. The statutory
liability is considerably broader in scope because not confined to re-
coveries for fault, but shallower in depth through lighter awards,
Consequently, to permit an employee an action at law is to invade that
immunity for which the employer has bargained.0 The majority rule
is that workmen's compensation does not constitute an exclusive rem-
edy so as to bar an employee's common law action for an injury not
compensable under the particular act in the jurisdiction. 7 The theory
3. McDaniel v. Kerr, 258 S.W.2d 629 (Mo. 1953). For a general discussion of
some of the various types of fact situations productive of noncompensable in-juries see 1 SCHNEMDR, WORKMEN's COMPENSATION 233 et seq. (1941).
4. McKay v. Delico Meat Products Co., 351 Mo. 876, 174 S.W.2d 149 (1943).
5. Thomas v. Parker Rust Proof Co., 284 Mich. 260, 279 N.W. 604 (1938) ; Lee
v. American Enka Corp., 212 N.C. 455, 193 S.E. 809 (1937) ; Francis v. Carolina
Wood Turning Co., 208 N.C. 517, 181 S.E. 628 (1935). At the present time the
minority view seems confined to Michigan and North Carolina, but a recent New
York decision, Citolo v. General Electric Co., 305 N.Y. 209,112 N.E.2d 197 (1953),
has held that an employee with an occupational disease not compensable under the
statute is not entitled to a common law remedy. The facts, however, involve a
peculiar.statutory situation. Partially disabling silicosis was removed from the list
of occupational diseases and the court felt this indicated a legislative intent to
deny all remedies to the plaintiff. This case has received adverse comment in 28
ST. JOHN'S L. Rnv. 142 (1953), but it is suggested that the problem is one for legis-
lative solution.
6. See Mabley & Carew Co. v. Lee, 129 Ohio St. 69, 75,193 N.E. 745, 747 (1934),
overruled by Triff, Admx. v. National Bronze & Aluminum Foundry Co., 135 Ohio
St. 191, 20 N.E.2d 232 (1939). But see id. at 208, 20 N.E.2d at 239 (Weygandt,
C.J., dissenting opinion); 4cL at 209, 20 N.E.2d at 240 (Matthias J., dissenting
opinion). See Rhoads, The Workmen's Compensation Act, 9 Micn. B.J. 129,
130-131 (1930).
7. Foley v. Western Alloyed Steel Casting Co., 219 Minn. 571, 18 N.W.2d 541(1945) ; Billo v. Allegheny Steel Co., 328 Pa. 97, 195 Ati. 110 (1937); Triff Admx
v. National Bronze and Aluminum Foundry Co., 135 Ohio St. 191, 20 N.E.2d 232
(1939); 2 LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION 136 (1952); PRoSsE,
TORTS 544 (1941).
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of the majority view is that while workmen's compensation was per-
haps originally conceived as the sole occupant of the area of litigation
by employees against employers covered by the system, its failure to
provide compensation over the whole of that area should not deprive
the uncompensated employee of his common law remedy where the act
is inapplicable.,
The Missouri Workmen's Compensation Act provides: "The rights
and remedies herein granted to an employee, shall exclude all other
rights and remedies of such employee . . . except such rights and
remedies as are not provided for by this chapter." In the light of this
statutory language, a holding contrary to that in the principal case
could scarcely be imagined. The minority view is based on statutory
wording quite different from that of the Missouri statute.0
While the question in McDaniel v. Kerr appears to have been treated
as one of first instance, the court cited an earlier case which reached
the same result on similar facts." The decision in the principal case
resolves any doubt and places Missouri squarely in alignment with the
prevailing and better view.
8. See Triff, Admax. v. National Bronze & Aluminum Foundry Co., 135 Ohio St.
191, 106, 20 N.E.2d 232, 239 (1939). 2 LARSON, op. cit. vtpra note 7, at 135.
9. Mo. Rm,. STAT. § 287.120 (2) (1949).
10. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-10 (1950):
The rights and remedies herein granted to an employee where he and his
employer have accepted the provisions of this article, respectively, to pay and
accept compensation on account of personal injury or death by accident, shall
exclude all other rights and remedies of such employee, his personal repre-
sentative, parents, dependents or next of kin, as against his employer at com-
mon law, or otherwise, on account of such injury, loss of service, or death....
11. In Row v. Cape Girardeau Foundry Co., 141 S.W.2d 113 (Mo. App. 1940),
plaintiff brought a claim for workmen's compensation. The referee for the Work-
men's Compensation Commission decided that plaintiff's injury was not com-
pensable. Plaintiff subsequently brought a common law action against his em-
ployer and obtained a default judgment. In a garnishment proceeding to satisfy the
iudgment of the trial court, issue was joined on the validity of the trial court
judgment, which the St. Louis Court of Appeals affirmed as being within the ex-
ercise of the lower court's proper jurisdiction. Although the court in the Row
case achieved the same result as in MeDaniels r. Kerr, the decision has not been
relied upon for this point for the probable reasons that the judgment went by
default in the trial court, and that the issue was presented to the appellate court
by way of a collatei a] attack upon the jurisdiction of the trial court.
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